JC 010
– Filosofia da Cincia I
Ps-Graduao
– Mestrado em Divulgao Cientfica e Cultural
4 crditos (4 horas-aula/semana) – 2
Semestre de 2015
Prof. Silvio Seno Chibeni
Departamento de Filosofia- IFCH - www.unicamp.br/~chibeni
Horrio:
Segundas-feiras [horrio: consulte a secretaria do MDCC]
Local:
[a ser definido; consulte a secretaria]
Ementa: O curso apresenta e discute os principais conceitos e argumentos envolvidos na controvrsia contempornea acerca do realismo cientfico, tese epistemolgica segundo a qual a cincia visa a nos fornecer, com suas teorias, uma descrio ao menos aproximadamente verdadeira da realidade.
Avaliao: A avaliao ser baseada em um trabalho de
final de curso, individualizado para cada aluno, em seminrios a serem
apresentados pelos alunos sobre os projetos para esse trabalho, e na
participao efetiva nas aulas. O trabalho dever ter a forma de um artigo
acadmico. Seu objeto dever ser a apresentao e anlise crtica de um (ou
mais) artigo ou livro referente ao problema do realismo cientfico, a ser
escolhido pelo aluno, sujeito s seguintes condies: 1. aprovao pelo
professor; 2. diferente para cada aluno; 3. excludos os artigos discutidos ao
longo do curso.
Programa - (detalhes sero definidos oportunamente)
Parte I - Familiarizao
com alguns conceitos e argumentos bsicos. (Entre outros, sero discutidos os textos
de Popper e Nagel indicados na bibliografia, abaixo.)
Parte II - Estudo dos captulos
1 e 2 do livro de van Fraassen,
The Scientific Image.
Parte III - Anlise
de alguns artigos crticos das posies de van Fraassen, a serem oportunamente escolhidos na literatura,
uma vez conhecido
o perfil da turma de alunos
Bibliografia bsica –
(detalhes e complementaes sero fornecidos oportunamente)
I. Artigos e livro de S. S. Chibeni:
Berkeley e o
papel das hipteses na filosofia
natural. Scientiae Studia. v. 8, n. 3, p.
389-419,
2010.
Explanations in microphysics: A response to van Fraassens
argument.
Principia, 12(1):
2008, pp. 49–71.
Afirmando o conseqente:
Uma defesa do realismo
cientfico (?!).
Scientiae Studia 4 (2): 221-249, 2006.
A Humean analysis of scientific realism. Ensaios
sobre Hume, Lvia Guimares (org.), Belo Horizonte,
Segrac Editora,
2005. Pp. 89-108
Quintons neglected argument for scientific realism. Journal for General Philosophy of
Science, 36 (2): 393-400, 2005.
Locke on the epistemological
status
of scientific laws. Principia, 9 (1-2): 19-41, 2005.
Realismo cientfico empirista? Principia, 1 (2): 255-69, 1997b.
Aspectos
da Descrio Fsica da Realidade. CLE, Unicamp, 1997a.
A inferncia abdutiva e o realismo cientfico.
Cadernos de Histria e Filosofia da
Cincia, Srie 3, 6 (1): 45-73,
1996.
Descartes e o realismo cientfico. Reflexo,
n. 57, pp. 35-53, 1993.
II. Outras referncias (das quais sero oportunamente escolhidas alguns textos para
anlise no curso):
BOYD, R. The current status
of scientific realism. In: Leplin 1984, p.
4l-82.
CARRIER, M. What is wrong with
the miracle argument? Studies
in the History and Philosophy of Science, 22, 1, p. 23-36, 1991.
––––. What is right
with the miracle argument: Establishing a taxonomy of
natural kinds. Studies
in the History and Philosophy of Science, 24, 3, p. 391-409, 1993.
CARTWRIGHT, N. How the Laws of Physics Lie, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1983.
CLARCKE, S. P. & LYONS, T. D. (eds.), Recent
Themes in the Philosophy of Science, Scientific Realism and Common Sense. (Australasian
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 17.) Dordrecht,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
CHURCHLAND, P.M. & HOOKER, C.A. (eds.) Images of Science. Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1985.
CUSHING, J. T., DELANEY,
C.F. & GUTTING, G. M. (eds.) Science and Reality. Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science. Essays
in Honor of Ernan McMullin.
Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
ELLIS, B. What Science Aims to Do. In: CHURCHLAND
& HOOKER 1985, pp. 48-74.
ENNIS, R. H.
Enumerative induction and best explanation (Comments and criticism). The Journal of Philosophy,
65 (18): 523-29, 1968.
FINE,
A. The Natural Ontological Attitude. In: LEPLIN 1984, pp.
83-107. (reimpresso
em FINE 1986, cap. 7.)
––––. The
Shaky Game.
Einstein, Realism and the Quantum Theory. Chicago and London, University of
Chicago Press, 1986. (Caps. 6 a 9.)
––––. Unnatural
attitudes: Realist and instrumentalist attachments to science. Mind, 45, 378, p. 149-79,
1986b.
GHINS, M. Putnams no-miracle argument: A
critique. In: Clarke & Lyons, 2002, p. 121-138.
––––. Can Common Sense
Realism be Extended to Theoretical Physics? Logic
Journal of the IGPL (International Group for Philosophical Logic),
13, 1, p. 95-111, Jan. 2005. (http://jigpal.oxfordjournals.org/)
HACKING, I. Representing
and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
HARDIN, C. &
ROSENBERG, A. In
defense of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science 53,
p. 31-51, 1982.
HARMAN, G. Inference to
the best explanation. The
Philosophical Review, 74 (1):
88-95, 1965.
––––.
Enumerative induction as inference to the best explanation.
The Journal of
Philosophy, 65 (18): 529-33,
1968.
HEMPEL, C. G. Philosophy of
Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall,
1966.
HOOKER, C.A. Surface
Dazzle, Ghostly Depths: An Exposition and Critical
Evaluation of van Fraassens Vindication of Empiricism
against Realism. In: CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 153-196.
LAUDAN, L. A confutation of
convergent realism. In: Leplin 1984, p. 218-49. 1984a.
––––. Explaining the success of
science: Beyond epistemic realism and relativism. In: Cushing et al.
1984, p. 83-105. 1984b.
––––. Progress and its Problems. Berkeley and Los Angeles,
University of California Press, 1977.
––––. Science and
Values. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984c.
––––. Science and
Relativism. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990.
––––. Beyond
Positivism and Relativism, Oxford, Westview Press, 1996.
LAUDAN, L. & LEPLIN, J. Empirical
equivalence and underdetermination. The Journal of Philsophy, 88, 9,
p. 449-472, 1991.
LEPLIN, J. (ed.) Scientific Realism. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of
California Press, 1984.
¾¾. A Novel Defense of Scientific
Realism. New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.
LEWIS, P. Why the
pessimistic induction is a fallacy. Synthese, 129, p. 371-380, 2001.
LIPTON, P. Inference to the Best Explanation.
2nd. ed., London, Routledge,
2004.
MAXWELL, G. The Ontological Status
of Theoretical Entities. In: Feigl, H. &
Maxwell, G. (eds.) Scientific
Explanation, Space and Time. (M.S.P.S. vol. III.) Minneapolis, University
of Minnessota Press, 1962. Pp. 3-27.
MEEHL, P. The miracle argument for realism: An
important lesson to be learned by generalizing from Carriers counter-examples.
Studies in the History
and Philosophy of Science, 23, 2, p. 267-282, 1992.
MUSGRAVE,
A. Constuctive Empiricism versus Scientific Realism. The
Philosophical Quarterly 32(128):
262-271, 1982.
––––.
Realism versus Constructive Empiricism. In: CHURCHLAND
& HOOKER 1985, pp. 197-221.
NAGEL,
E. The Structure of
Science. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.
NIINILUOTO, I. Critical Scientific Realism.
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.
NORRIS, C. Ontology according to van Fraassen: Some problems with constructive empiricism. Metaphilosophy, 28, 3, p. 196-218, 1997.
POPPER, K. R. Conjectures and Refutations. 4.ed., revised. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1972a.
PSILLOS, S. Scientific
Realism. How Science Tracks Truth, London and New York, Roudledge,
1999.
PUTNAM, H. What is mathematical truth. In:
Mathematics, Matter and Method. (Philosophical Papers, v.1.) Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1975.
––––. Meaning and the Moral Sciences.
Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.
SALMON, W. Scientific
Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1984.
SMART, J. J. C. Between Science and Philosophy. New York, Ramdom House, 1968.
THAGARD, P. R. The best explanation for theory choice. The Journal of Philosophy, 75 (2): 76-92, 1978.
VAN FRAASSEN, B.C. The Scientific Image. Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1980.
––––.
To Save the Phenomena. In: LEPLIN 1984, pp. 250-259.
––––.
Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science. In:
CHURCHLAND & HOOKER 1985, pp. 245-308.
––––. The Empirical Stance. New Haven,
Yale University Press, 2002.