British expert highlights the United Kingdom's interest in the developments of the presidential election in Brazil
The Brazilian presidential elections have never aroused as much interest in the United Kingdom as those of 2018. This is the observation of professor of urban geography Gareth Jones, from the prestigious London School of Economics (LSE), an in-depth knowledge of the political, economic and social situation in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. According to Jones, who directs a study center on the region at LSE – the Latin America and Caribbean Center –, British academia and the press placed the public debate on the electoral campaign in Brazil on the spectrum between concern and alarm, and continue closely following the developments of Jair Bolsonaro's victory. On the academic side, the biggest reason for concern, in the expert's view, is the uncertainty regarding the continuity of research partnerships and student exchanges between Brazil and the United Kingdom.
In the following interview, given on the 7th during a visit to Unicamp, Jones explains the reasons for the greater British interest in the Brazilian presidential contest and compares reactions in the United Kingdom to the elections of Bolsonaro, in Brazil, and Donald Trump, in the United States. . Graduated in economics and geography from University College London and PhD in geography from University from Cambridge, Jones also analyzes the arrival of Andrés Manuel López Obrador as president of Mexico, a country that is at the center of much of his research.
A student, among other subjects, of violence in cities such as the Mexican capital and Rio de Janeiro, Jones also talks about how the growth of crime in certain urban areas can affect future generations. Violence, in fact, will be the central theme of a series of workshops that LSE intends to hold next year in partnership with Unicamp and the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP), the details of which are also covered in the conversation below:
What is the purpose of your visit to Brazil and, more specifically, to Unicamp?
Gareth Jones – I came to São Paulo for two reasons. One of them was to meet with representatives of local institutions – mainly universities, but also from Fapesp and the British Council. Our objective is to strengthen the collaborations we have in São Paulo, expand our contact with Brazilian researchers and take research "made in Brazil" to a more prominent position in the academic debate in Europe. The other reason represents a small step in that direction. We have a small joint grant from the British Council and Fapesp to hold a series of workshops next year, with Unicamp and PUC-SP, on violence and security. I'm here at Unicamp with the mission of understanding the university and thinking about future collaborations; and, very specifically, because of these future workshops.
Have the dates for the workshops already been set? What are the expected results?
Gareth Jones – We still have to resolve some details, but I believe the workshops will be held in October. We will bring 18 doctoral students, not only from LSE, but also from other parts of the United Kingdom, to meet with professors and with more or less the same number of doctoral students from Unicamp and PUC-SP. We want students to talk about their research, collaborate with each other, learn from each other, and perhaps produce results in the form of articles, blogs, etc. We obviously hope that these workshops will form part of a larger and richer collaboration between universities – a collaboration that will hopefully develop beyond the theme of violence and security.
Violence and security were one of the central themes of this year's Brazilian elections. How do you assess Jair Bolsonaro's victory in the presidential race and what do you expect from his future government?
Gareth Jones – I'm going to avoid the question about my expectations because I just don't know what's going to happen. What I can say is that something very interesting happened in the United Kingdom regarding the public discussion about the Brazilian elections. Brazil's elections and political context have always attracted the attention of the British public, whether in relation to Lula, Dilma, Temer or anyone else. But the interest was more in the speech, and not so much in the mechanics of the elections. For the first time in my life – and I'm not young – I saw a really intense interest around the mechanics of elections.
To what do you attribute this greater interest?
Gareth Jones – For the first time, a relative outsider of the electoral system – someone who at least presented himself as not belonging to the establishment politician – could win the Brazilian presidential race. And there were, of course, the echoes of Brexit, of Trump, of Italy, of Spain. We still don't understand the answers to how Brexit happened, how Trump won the American elections and perhaps even how Erdogan was re-elected in Turkey. Therefore, Bolsonaro's victory seemed to us simply to be a repetition of these scenarios.
How did the British see the possibility of these scenarios being repeated in Brazil?
Gareth Jones – In general, the public discussion of the Brazilian elections in the press was very similar to that which took place in academia. I'd say they both fell on the spectrum between concern and alarm – and not quite on the positive side of the needle. Bolsonaro's statements on sexuality were very poorly received in the United Kingdom, as was the cancellation of Brazil's role at the UN Climate Conference. I have just come from Cuba, from a seminar we organized on health security. One of the lectures was about the Mais Médicos program. Previously, something like Mais Médicos would not receive any attention in the UK; now, it becomes headlines. We are still experiencing the emotional explosion of the elections. Whatever the topic, we are following it with a certain degree of concern, trying to imagine the direction of movement. From the university's perspective, the concern is about the future of research collaborations and student exchanges between the United Kingdom and Brazil – that is, whether these partnerships will become less stable, less secure, or undergo some type of direction.
What caused more surprise in the United Kingdom: Trump's election in the United States or Bolsonaro's in Brazil?
Gareth Jones – I understand that Trump's election was much more surprising, although the American political system allows us to see competition disappear, on both the Republican and Democratic sides, during the primaries. What we have, then, is a one-on-one dispute – something unusual in European politics, in which there are normally multiple parties, multiple candidates. Once it was decided that it would be Trump against Clinton, and knowing how the electoral college works, I don't think that Trump's victory was a shock. I was in the United States at the time of two televised debates. In one of them, I remember watching the debate in a hotel room in Miami and, halfway through, I thought: "damn, Trump is going to win." This was, of course, a reactive fear. But then I realized that this was not an election based on technocratic arguments, precision and rationality. It was an election around both ends of the spectrum. In the current climate in which the United States lives, the electoral system works very much in favor of this type of dispute. You are also moving in this direction.
Didn't Bolsonaro's election cause any surprises, then, in the United Kingdom?
Gareth Jones – From our point of view, it was much less of a surprise who won, because we understand that there was no national recognition of the PT candidate's name. In the wake of the impeachment [of ex-president Dilma Rouseff], Lava Jato and everything else, there was a candidate with an emotional argument – convincing or not – to present, and another who could not counter-argument in a very convincing way. This was the impression that was received internationally. Bolsonaro's victory itself, therefore, did not surprise us, although there is an emotional surprise regarding everything he says. The interesting thing is that his statements are surprising, but it is not surprising that he makes them. You think he's going to say something about sexuality, for example, "Yes, he said something. I'm not surprised. Wow! I'm surprised he said it that way."
The center you direct promoted a panel a few days ago entitled "Beyond Populism: the rise of Bolsonaro in Brazil", in which the result of the Brazilian presidential election was discussed. What would you highlight about this meeting?
Gareth Jones – The argument in the title of the event is that Bolsonaro is beyond even populism – beyond Trump, Orbán [Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary], etc. Unfortunately, I was in Cuba at the time, but I can tell you something that illustrates the intensity of interest in the topic. We reserved a room for this event with capacity for around 70 people. Normally, we would expect to receive all 70 applications within a day or two. Within three hours, however, we had already reached 70 registrants and had another 90 people on the waiting list. We ended up seating around 120 people in the room, despite the fire regulations. The discussion started around 18:30 pm and went on until 21:30 pm, long after the time when the lights in our center usually go out. Returning to Dilma's election, I think that an event like this would attract a significant but relatively identifiable audience. The same would happen with Lula. We would probably have to go back to 1989 to attract a group as spontaneous as we are now, formed not only by Brazilians or people interested in Brazil, but by people who, in some way, see what is happening in the country as part of a phenomenon that it really needs to be understood. This understanding is not necessary for now, nor for next year, but for half a generation from now, as the effects [of Bolsonaro's election] will be felt throughout this period.
Contrary to Brazil, Mexico, a country about which you have in-depth knowledge, a few days ago witnessed the inauguration of a left-wing politician as president. What analysis do you make of Andrés Manuel López Obrador's victory in the Mexican elections?
Gareth Jones – AMLO's election allows for an interesting comparison with Brazil and other countries around the world. Three elections ago – that is, 18 years ago, in the case of Mexico – AMLO was the "evil one", the left-wing candidate to be avoided, seen as populist and considered unelectable in a system based on rational technocratic politics. He managed to transform his image while generally maintaining the same message. With this, he stopped being the "anti-this", "anti-that", and started to be seen as a outsider rational, careful, experienced. He led a magnificent election campaign, very organized, detailed and charismatic. In general, people seem calm about AMLO's transition from opposition, from a populist stance, to government. There are concerns among the elite, but what I hear in private is that the majority is seeing that he chose a sensible ministry and began to deal, as he had promised, with some issues on which there is consensus in society. If we look at Mexico from the Bolsonaro effect, we will see an interesting contrast with a president who is also a outsider, but he seems to have knowledge of what he does and to be quite trustworthy. Initial indications are that AMLO is not outside the parameters of political normality. I think there's a fair amount of conscious hope for Mexico right now. There is a level of goodwill, academically and in public debate. So far, so good.
Returning to the topic of the seminars that LSE will hold with Unicamp and PUC-SP: to what extent do you believe that the recent explosion in violence rates in Brazil can affect the country from a macroeconomic point of view?
Gareth Jones – I have not studied the subject from that perspective. But I can make a comparison with Colombia, although it involves very different types of violence. There is a good amount of data that shows that violence has affected both GDP, Colombia's wealth, the distribution of that wealth and the vitality of the economy. In the Colombian case, the violence, which was largely rural, semi-urban, attracted the vitality of the economy, for 20, 30 years, to certain cities and certain sectors within the city. This obviously had negative effects on the rest of the country, where the violence was concentrated, in terms of the public budget, jobs, etc. Bringing it to Brazil, I don't believe that the same empirical comparison can be made because of the nature of the violence, which is more urban here. But I think the message is similar. Violence has a real impact on the distribution of public assistance. They tell me, for example, that it is impossible to bring universal healthcare to certain areas of São Paulo or the country because of the lack of security. This has a long-term, intergenerational impact, which translates into clinical numbers, epidemiological indices, mortality rates, differences in life expectancy between populations, etc. In other words: it is not just about people being killed or injured directly, but also indirectly, over a period of 10, 20 years. Furthermore, differences in life expectancy and quality of life have a real effect on human capital on the functioning of the economy, decisions regarding investments and productivity, and the level of risk that people assume with their household budgets. Someone who needs to spend money on healthcare or other public goods stops expanding their store and formalizing their small business.