Book exposes Traditionalist thinking, one of the most conservative facets of the new global right
Benjamin Teitelbaum is an ethnographer, PhD from Brown University and professor of International Relations at the University of Colorado (United States). He conducted interviews with right-wing ideologues between 2018 and 2019, to compose the book, released in English at the beginning of 2020. The translation into Portuguese is now coming from Editora da Unicamp.
Editora da Unicamp interviewed Teitelbaum, who met with the main figures linked to the populist politicians of the new right in several countries: Aleksandr Dugin, in Putin's Russia, Steve Bannon, in Trump's United States and Olavo de Carvalho, in Brazil's Bolsonaro. What seems to link these and other personalities in a network are principles of Traditionalism, a philosophical current that emerged at the beginning of the 20th century.
Unicamp publisher: In your book, you distinguish traditionalism — a well-known term in a general sense — from Traditionalism — the movement that has gained a significant space in the sociopolitical atmosphere. What is the difference between the word with a lowercase “t” and the word with a capital “T”?
Benjamin Teitelbaum: Traditionalism with a capital T is a little-known and exceptionally enigmatic, which has roots in early 20th century southern Europe. Whenever I'm writing and talking about this school, I wish it had an equally eccentric name, but alas... Traditionalism seeks to uncover the truths of the universe through the study of esoteric branches of various religions, most often Sufi Islam. and Hinduism, based on the premise that these religions contain fragments of ancient teachings that have been lost to humanity. Only secondarily, and only for some of its followers, Traditionalism is also a political ideology centered on the grandiose and vague task of opposing modernity, an era that they consider to be marked by the most profound offensive to eternal truths.
The characteristics of Traditionalism that matter most in politics include, firstly, the belief in cyclical and non-linear time; which means that instead of progressing from a moment of corruption for a future of glory, societies are almost always in a cycle of decline, which ends in a cataclysm to be reborn in virtue, and then the decline begins again, and so on. Second would be the belief that virtuous societies are formed around a Indo-European based hierarchical caste system, with a small elite of spriests at the top of a pyramid below do which are gwarriors, cmerchants and, finally, a base formed by the mass of eslaves. When times are good, the hierarchy is intact and the spirituality of the spriests reign, but when times are bad, the materialism of priests eslaves and cThe traders rule, and the hierarchy itself is dissolved as humanity is leveled into a single mass. And finally, the belief—sometimes called "inversion"—that when times are bad and humanity is flattened into a lower mass during the end of a time cycle, things will be understood contrary to how they actually are. are: what we think is good is, in fact, bad; someone who is officially devoted to the spiritual field is a slave to materialism; teachers spread ignorance instead of knowledge; journalists misinform; artists create ugliness, etc.
All this sets the stage for a political analysis that rejects fundamental liberal notions of progress, condemns the materialist (economic) focus of most modern politics, rejects formal specialties and official qualifications. Furthermore, it sees the destruction of work as something necessary at the end of a cycle of time, which has, ahead, a moment of rebirth. This analysis is mainly based on Eastern esoteric religious teachings.
Some of this may resemble "traditionalism" with a small t, or "traditionalist" in the common sense of the term. In particular, we can note that both traditionalism and Traditionalism share skepticism towards progress and the belief that society is becoming less ordered and more chaotic, empty of authenticity. However, Traditionalism not only takes these ideas to extreme points and defends them based on religious teachings that may be considered obscure, but also introduces a peculiar characteristic by considering that the decline of society can be hailed and celebrated as a sign that a cycle of time is coming to an end and rebirth is approaching. Social decline leaves a Traditionalist pessimistic, but a Traditionalist hopeful.
Unicamp publisher: How does Traditionalism interpret history?
Benjamin Teitelbaum: Traditionalists look at today's society and see an increasingly homogenized world, where borders of all kinds — between nations, genders, cultures, ethnicities — are being erased. They see the distinction and social role of spiritual leaders as desacralized. Materialism, unlike spirituality, is the predominant principle in society, and is what allows the expansion of the leveling and homogenization of the world. And Traditionalists think that everything indicates that we are heading toward the end of a cycle of time—the dark ages of the Kali Yuga. And they believe that time is cyclical and that absolute darkness is followed by a golden age (before the decline begins again). Traditionalism, moreover, suggests that a profound change is approaching and that social forms opposed to those of today—a resurgence of political and social boundaries, of hierarchy and theocracy—will return.
This is a general account of history and how the present fits into it according to political Traditionalism. However, as you move away from generalizations and toward specifics, you observe that individuals differ in their understandings, just as they vary in the emphasis they place on the elements of this historical narrative. For example, in the book I show how different figures attribute the role of the force of globalization, homogenization and secularization to China and the United States. And these figures have varying levels of adherence to the belief that populist revolutions around the world are a reaction to this force. Furthermore, Bannon values Brazil because he believes the country was late to modernity and, therefore, perhaps preserved more pre-modern virtues, which could be used to resurrect the rest of the West.
Unicamp publisher: Until recently, Traditionalism was a very isolated movement in right-wing politics. The book reveals that one of the ways in which his political influence grew was not exactly through politics, but through metapolitics, that is, through the formation of cultural values through "the arts, entertainment, intellectualism, religion and education". How does Traditionalism connect to metapolitics? How does Traditionalist metapolitics operate in different countries, such as the USA, Russia and Brazil?
Benjamin Teitelbaum: Metapolitics, generally speaking, is political activism conducted through unorthodox means. It is the belief that to form political values in a society, you must not become a politician, but instead a poet, an actor, a musician, an educator or a journalist, as they are the ones who create our society. World vision. Politicians simply react to this. Metapolitics has little formal connection to Traditionalism, but both are popular in some far-right intellectual circles. And there may be a reason for the interest aroused by both, because both the strategy of metapolitics and the ideology embedded in Traditionalism reject the democratic electoral political system (remembering that for Traditionalists, official explanations of all types are bound to be wrong in modernity) . It may be for this reason that political figures inspired by Traditionalism are exaggeratedly involved in the media and intellectuals. While working for Brexit and Trump, Bannon committed himself to studying and applying new techniques for manipulating voters through social media, and is currently trying to found a school for populist ideologues in Italy. Dugin and Olavo are writers, journalists and teachers. Even the secondary figures in my book, like Jason Jorjani and Tibor Baranyi, are not just writers but work in publishing and educational circles.
But the connection I establish between these activities and the ideological orientations of those who act in them is a relationship of intelligible co-occurrence and not an explicit and theorized connection. Traditionalism, in its most doctrinal forms, does not aim to change society, because it believes that the most important changes are destined to happen due to a cosmic cycle of time. It does not seek to convert the masses to its messages, because the masses should not be celebrated or uplifted. For these reasons, it is difficult to speak of Traditionalist metapolitics. Metapolitics, in turn, is the landmark of a radical right-wing current, whose interest in breaking with orthodoxy tends to lead its members to alternative ideas and methods.
Unicamp publisher: The Traditionalist movement uses new means of communication and appears to legitimize itself by denying the credibility of the hegemonic media. How crucial was this to the expansion of Traditionalism as a political force?
Benjamin Teitelbaum: Accepting hegemonic media as legitimate sources of information about current events goes against the most essential understandings of Traditionalists. According to them, in the era we live in, by definition, professional institutions such as the media are prepared to produce content opposite to what they should (remember the principle of "inversion" mentioned earlier). This stance may not seem different from that of an ordinary right-wing populist, but it will only be so if we do not look at its motivations and justifications. It is here, as well as in its oppositions to science and formal education, that the dark eschatology of Traditionalism and the anti-system facade of the populist stance mix. So, delegitimizing the hegemonic media is a starting point for these ideologies. But both face a problem as they create their parallel media; After all, how do Traditionalists manage to endorse the veracity of their media in the midst of an era of decadence? And how can populists claim to be anti-system if they are the system itself?
Unicamp publisher: In the book, you show that Steve Bannon said that "it was not all good news" when he referred to the racists and anti-Semites who joined the nationalist movements, although he also found that these people would disappear as the Traditionalist-inspired movements matured. . How does the Traditionalist right differ from fascism and neo-Nazism?
Benjamin Teitelbaum: When I distinguish the Traditionalist right from fascism and Nazism, I do not think to say that the first is less dangerous than the last two. In fact, the father of political Traditionalism, Julius Evola, saw himself on the right of fascism.
Traditionalism considers itself truly anti-modern and often accuses fascism and Nazism—despite their destructive natures—of being essentially modern political causes. And this reasoning is not false or difficult to follow, as fascism and Nazism believe in mass organization and rationalization, in the revolutionary potential of modern science, and in some form of egalitarianism.
Both Nazism and fascism were progressive, despite having their own visions of progress and seeing the past as something to be overcome. Traditionalists regard all of this as a dangerous replication of the same principles that underpin liberalism. And the justification of the Traditionalists who supported Nazism and fascism (like, again, Julius Evola) was that a reactionary nationalism offered a temporary alternative to the even more massive leveling forces of communism and global capitalism. For them, if fascism prevailed, it could later be transformed into a more theocratic, less materialist and less egalitarian sociopolitical model, which perhaps would come closer to Traditionalist ideals.
This makes me unreceptive to the ideas of those who believe that Traditionalism is nothing more than fascism in disguise. And it must also be recognized that the Traditionalist school of thought is able to avoid some of the blatantly incendiary characteristics of Hitler and Mussolini. Explicit racism and machismo, for example, are variables that appear in only some currents of Traditionalism. Yet, in virtually all circumstances, Traditionalists do not support progressive, emancipatory movements like feminism or anti-racism (emancipation, that is, liberation from a past of oppression into a future of freedom, is a false concept in Traditionalist eyes). . And their opposition to liberal democracy is deeper, more theorized, and possibly more radical and elaborate than that of the average neo-Nazi today.
Unicamp publisher: As you show in the book, Tibor Baranyi, the advisor to the Hungarian nationalist Jobbik party, considered you to be some kind of spy and saboteur and refused to meet with you. Were there other tense moments during his research, especially when you met the world's most influential figures on the Traditionalist right?
Benjamin Teitelbaum: Every face-to-face interaction I've had has been cordial and pleasant. This applies to Bannon and Olavo as much as it does to Baranyi. For Dugin too, although I should mention that having any kind of contact with him in the US has always been very stressful given that he is under government sanction.
In fact, the most unsettling and threatening moments came when I was following a bizarre network of agents who were trying to use Traditionalism to lobby Bannon and then Trump. They seemed unserious in many ways, full of themselves and constantly delusional. Still, they induced the people around them to act not only recklessly, but criminally. I was preparing to approach one of these figures, a man named Michael Bagley, when, during my research, he was arrested in an FBI raid for attempting to launder money for a Mexican drug cartel.
I was glad I didn't get too close to that situation, but it was a reminder that when you venture to the most extreme ideological margins, you often enter worlds of deep social instability and insecurity. It was a dramatic situation with Bagley, but chaotic and destructive lifestyles are also part of the biographies of other prominent figures I've studied—some I've written about, some I haven't.
Unicamp publisher: The rich fund Traditionalists. Steve Bannon received millions of dollars from billionaires Rebekah and Robert Mercer to create Cambridge Analytica, the data company that influenced Brexit and Donald Trump's election. Aleksandr Dugin was financed by wealthy occult enthusiasts. And, although Olavo de Carvalho's source of financing is not defined, it must exist, at least to cover his high expenses with law firms, given the many lawsuits against him. What is the expected return on these investments in Traditionalists?
Benjamin Teitelbaum: The financial interest in Bannon, Olavo and Dugin is based on practical politics, on the ability of these figures to promote far-right populist leaders and parties. If wealthy financiers had a full understanding of what Traditionalism is, I assume they would react negatively. Or perhaps they didn't take what they discovered seriously, seeing it as a weird side interest of the strategists and propagandists they financed.
However, the lack of attention to these figures' connections with Traditionalism has a deeper reason. What's surprising—and it's a mystery I present in the book but don't try to solve—is that in many cases, powerful interests turned to ideologues who had access to alternative media formats in order to advance their political goals, and it turns out that each of them had an affiliation with Traditionalism. Bannon, Olavo and Dugin are just a few of many around the world who could serve as strategists or spokespersons for right-wing populism. But each of them, independently of the other, has a connection with schools of thought that basically do not exist in the world of politics — be they alternative spiritualities in general or Traditionalism in particular. Their similar and unusual ideological orientations may seem coincidental or, in other words, not essential to public campaigns promoting standard right-wing populism. But we cannot consider them a mere coincidence and eccentricity, not only because of the extreme originality of Traditionalism, but especially because these figures gained awareness of each other and their common affiliations, and, furthermore, because they tried to mobilize and act together. from this affiliation.
Unicamp publisher: Olavo de Carvalho emphatically criticized your book, saying that you wrongly associate it with Traditionalism. Would you like to comment on your statements?
Benjamin Teitelbaum: Normally, I would be quite distressed to learn that someone I wrote about felt misrepresented. This especially hits home for me, because I've seen mainstream journalists and academics similar to myself get away with false characterizations, as long as they were criticizing the far right. Few people who have an impact on my career will police this aspect of my work, so I consider it essential that I police it myself.
Therefore, I was quite worried when I read Olavo's statements for the first time. However, his initial comments consisted of heated personal attacks with no substance, which is his standard response to anyone who writes about him. When he started giving details and making real arguments, the arguments themselves were meaningless. He spent a lot of time complaining about one word, my description of him as part of Bannon's "circle" (Bannon's "circle"), despite the word "circle"("circle") appears only in the subtitle of one of the English versions of the book, and never with that same meaning in the body of the text (although Olavo is certainly part of a circle that includes Bannon and others affiliated with Bolsonaro in Washington). He accused me of exaggerating the amount of time I spent with him, even though I had detailed at the beginning of the book, clearly and precisely, the extent of our contact. He disputed being placed in the same group as Russian ideologue Aleksandr Dugin, ignoring the fact that I devoted an entire chapter to the personal and philosophical conflicts between the two. His broader objections to having been affiliated with Traditionalism were also never substantial in content. Therefore, I maintain the characterizations I made. I expected Olavo to address the conclusion I reached, that he is not an orthodox thinker of any kind. Although there is resonance between him and Traditionalism in his oppositions to globalization, materialism, progressivism and science, it should mostly be interpreted as a symptom of Olavo's willingness to reject standard forms of knowledge. Not even this basic level of nuance can be found in his reactions, to this topic as to any other.
So I approached his comments with great caution, trying hard to see past their acidity. But I ended up disappointed by their content, or rather, their lack of content. Why this excess of emotion with such a meager basis — a "sound and fury, signifying nothing"?"? I had a few suspicions, the first being his professional aversion to associating with anything and anyone ("I'm my own guru now," he once declared). The second was that he avoided a subject covered in the book, which I now think was what bothered him most: my account of his involvement with Islam and the Sufi Traditionalist Frithjof Schuon. He talked about it later, more specifically in an interview with the BBC, first saying that I got it all wrong, but then exposing an episode from his past that matched everything I had written in the book. It wasn't a surprise. After all, what I wrote was based on academic research, official court documents and interviews with Olavo de Carvalho himself. Still, I laughed when I read that interview, sighed and said "screw it" to my computer screen. And I went to do something else.
A few days earlier, I had started reading some tweets from him suggesting that I was trying to get someone to spy on him and saying that he only met with Steve Bannon "twice", although a simple Google Images search provided ample proof to the contrary. . When I came across the BBC interview, I was tired of seeing Olavo wave an old cloth in the air as if it were a flag, to the roar of applause from his devotees.
I have reluctantly concluded that while aspects of his thought and biography deserve more serious analysis, the details of his social media chatter do not. In these forums, the deeper you go, the less sense it makes.
The War for Eternity is available for purchase on the Editora da Unicamp website.
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Title: War for eternity: The return of Traditionalism and the rise of the populist right
Author: Benjamin R. Teitelbaum
ISBN: 9786586253535
1st edition, 2020
288 pages
Dimensions: 23,00 x 16,00 x 1,50 cm.
Price: $ 66,00
Watch the video containing an interview with Benjamin Teitelbaum about Traditionalism during the II Brazilian Rights Symposium, which took place in July 2020, organized by the Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences (IFCH) at Unicamp:
