AThe questions in this report were formulated on the 9th (Tuesday). Over the next three days, the temperature increased. First, in the offices and chancelleries; then, at the 4th Union-European-Latin America/Caribbean Summit Conference, in Vienna. At the center of the controversy, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Evo Morales. The nationalization of Bolivian gas, which had been on the back burner, took on unexpected contours due to the exchange of accusations. On this and the next page, economists Cláudio Dedecca, Cláudio Shüller Maciel and José Maria da Silveira, all professors at the Institute of Economics at Unicamp (IE), shrewdly analyze the Latin American scenario.

Unicamp Newspaper – The election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was received with euphoria by the global left. At the time, the assessment was that a regional leadership was emerging whose echoes would revitalize an ideology disfigured by successive failures. More than three years after taking office, it is clear that Lula is far from exercising the expected leadership. What went wrong?

Cláudio Dedecca – The Lula government's biggest problem is its lack of boldness. More significant actions from the government were expected. However, it is worth highlighting that talking about boldness does not mean preaching radical attitudes, but rather the growth of the economy, the strengthening of the internal market and the reorganization of the financial system, with the aim of enabling a more sustained development process for the country.

Boldness here is synonymous with a clearer definition of what the political project for Brazil is. Lula didn't do that. Even though it has important initiatives, it is a government that has not gained its own appearance. There was a lack of a brand, both in the country and internationally. This enormously weakened the Lula government's position, including on the regional scene. Even because, in several neighboring countries, political changes ended up taking place that brought some boldness from the point of view of national strategies – this is the case of Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales and even Nestor Kirchner and Michelle Bachelet. These are presidents who came to government with a clear vision of what they intended to do with the State. The Lula government was so opaque that it obviously could not lead. There was no project to be sold.

Cláudio Schüller Maciel – The Lula government simultaneously practices a very orthodox macroeconomic policy, with low growth, and limited policies to reduce social exclusion. In recent years, little use has been made of the very favorable behavior of international trade, resulting in an increasingly more pronounced international presence, for example by China and India. We expected a government that would revive development strategies internally. Yes, to think about development, the mark of the best intellectual tradition in our Latin America.

Under the hegemony of the vassals of money, in the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, the country has been constrained by “inflation targets” and other gems of the Empire’s own macroeconomic “models”. There are indicators that show improvement, let's be fair, but external vulnerability is far from ruled out. If the reality were of abundant credit, low interest rates, selective industrial and technological policies, strong infrastructure investment – ​​energy, telecommunications, transport, housing, sanitation – not only would the internal market conditions be different, but they would also be being built much broader opportunities for our neighbors. In a Latin America post-economic destruction and reasonable neoliberal discredit, with enormous accentuation of social disparities, the integration sponsored by Brazil would need to be much deeper. Brazilian diplomacy knows and practices, the national/international bench dynamizes and the presidency seeks to fit into an intermediate outfit.

José Maria da Silveira – Placing neoliberalism as a common scarecrow, which unites people whose governments made mistakes in adopting it, is as poor an argument as failing to understand the evolution that occurred under neoliberalism, generating, for better or for worse, several points of no return. that cannot be resolved with rhetoric and voluntarism.

Complex economies like Brazil and Argentina do not work based on speeches. State action is necessary, but increasingly the State is a facilitator of cooperative and participatory arrangements that aim to coordinate long-term strategies between protagonists with different visions. This point is fundamental, as any investment, whether private or state, today passes through the scrutiny of participatory agreements. The Lula government encouraged this type of practice, but, at the same time, it created a snake, a little snake, which may be stillborn, but which had the appearance of dirigisme and party control over the economy.

JU – There are those who attribute the weakening of Brazil's position on the continent to mistakes made in the sphere of diplomacy. Do you agree?

Dedecca – I think the diplomatic strategy has been successful. The problem is that there is no resistance to diplomacy if the government is not clear about its political strategy. Diplomacy is just an instrument of government. By itself, it does not solve the problems that the country has in its relationship with the international community. If the government does not have a clear strategy of what it intends to do with the country from a growth point of view, if there is a lack of clarity on what the relationship with international business segments will be like, diplomacy will be weakened. Diplomacy is not the problem.

Maciel – We express, bluntly, our deep admiration for Brazil's diplomatic staff. Which bureaucracy has as its patron a figure equivalent to José Maria da Silva Paranhos do Rio Branco? Which country established limits with as many countries as Brazil did, limits sealed by diplomacy and which have not caused friction since the first decade of the 20th century? Our diplomats make mistakes, of course, but our current foreign policy defends national interests. In a time of single thinking, when fantasy images of globalization, the end of the nation-state, the end of barriers are sold, it is said that the presence of cadres who still know how to think nationally is not good.

Even less so that they venture to say and practice that, if we do not think about our destinies, there is no doubt that the Center will continue to do so, permanently, in accordance with its interests. Hence the alleged foreign bodies: South-South relations, although without excluding trade and investment relations with the North; opposition to the pattern of bilateral integration led by the United States and so on.

Silveira – Uniting Latin American peoples should not be a central concern of a Brazilian government. If it happens, let it come as a result. One of the characteristics of the Lula government was to open many fronts of discussion, sometimes leaving crucial issues in the background.

The starting point should have as a priority the medium and long-term gains of this cooperation, with attention to Argentina, in comparison with other options and even with the hassle of managing a pile of bilateral relations and not an idealization of a supposed cultural and Latin American socio-economic situation, which if it exists, is very precarious.
There are those who say that leading socio-political blocs is not in the Brazilian tradition. The fact is that Brazil is an economic leader and can generate a situation called “winner/winner” for nearby countries. The example is the case of Bolivia, where Petrobras investments could have the same beneficial effect as they had in several regions of Brazil.

Targeting political leadership can raise suspicions that hinder the establishment of contracts and business. In the Bolivian case, it appears that the Lula government overestimated the power of its leadership. It is still too early to be sure that such a mistake was made. The outcome of the negotiations will be an important indicator.

JU – In this context, Hugo Chávez increasingly assumes the role of protagonist. What assessment do you make of the positions adopted by the Venezuelan president?

Dedecca – Chávez became a protagonist because Lula's positions were very timid. It was natural that, in the resumption of nationalist positions in Latin America, some president would assume regional leadership. Lula didn't do it, he didn't show a project for the integration of Latin America – his talk is diffuse. Chávez, obviously, complied.

It is important to highlight that Spanish America has very different characteristics from Brazil. This component is little discussed. In Spanish America, a presidential candidate who promises something, if elected, needs to fulfill his program. When this doesn't happen, he is invariably deposed. In these countries, social and popular movements are not only more present, but also often take more violent positions.

Figures like Chávez, Morales and Kirchner are elected with a speech and are forced, by political time, to fulfill it. So there is nothing new. When Evo Morales nationalized the companies, the press screamed. However, he was elected promising to nationalize. Morales did nothing more than fulfill a campaign promise. More than that: if he didn't comply, he ran the risk of quickly losing legitimacy and even being deposed.

Maciel – The Indian Chávez is leaving a mark of profound action in Venezuela: laws on hydrocarbons, banks, land, microfinance, cooperatives, fishing, the coast and water. He resolutely asserts himself against neoliberalism and imperialism. It will be important for the energy and oil alliance to increasingly consolidate in South America, a position that he seems to strongly endorse. As for relations with the Empire and his inflammatory rhetoric, history will tell whether he pushed the signal too far.

Silveira – President Chávez has the opportunity – almost always lost by Latin American dictatorships in the past – to change the situation of poverty and inequality in his country, taking advantage of oil revenues, which are finite, but finite as in Vinícius' poem, while they last . According to estimates, these reserves will last a long time, as will Bolivian gas. If these countries have resources for a horizon that spans several generations, it makes no sense to ration the product to gain in price, on the grounds that in the past they were exploited by their own elite and their international friends. The response of an intelligent leader is to empower his company, as Petrobras did, and not to ridiculously exchange fuel for doctors, which simply makes Latin American precariousness clear. President Chavez's leadership does not fit the scale of countries like Argentina, Mexico and Brazil.

JU – Nationalism resurfaced with force in statements by Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales and even Lula. In your opinion, is this an anachronistic discourse bequeathed by populist caudillismo or a legitimate right inherent to the sovereignty of a country?

Dedecca – The resumption of nationalism in Latin America is due to the failure, in the 90s, of conservative policies. Even timidly, Lula himself expresses this rebirth. I don't think it's an anachronistic speech. I see it as a reaction to the policy adopted in the 90s in these countries, whose effects were disastrous. These were policies that caused large-scale unemployment, regression in terms of living standards in these societies, and alarming situations of poverty – this is the case in Bolivia and even in certain regions of Brazil.

Therefore, society reacts to the liberal politics of the 90s by seeking to defend its interests, which are its own. Nationalism is nothing more than the defense of these particular interests, in a good sense – it is the defense of what is dear to the citizen's life. This wave goes in that direction. The elections in Peru and Mexico, for example, signal that the issue is polarizing the debate. I don't see caudillism.

Maciel – In a previous response, we already expressed identity with the “anachronistic” discourse. It would be interesting to learn more about the speeches of the Chinese, Koreans, etc., as they were “anachronistic” practitioners of active development policies in the last two decades, with notable success, while “modern” Latin America experienced meager growth. “Modern” was Mexico, of course: signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (1994); deterioration of social conditions, disaggregated productive apparatus and producer of goods with low added value, infrastructural deficit, State incapable of positively meeting growing social demands...

Silveira – I recommend reading the book The King of Girgenti, by Andrea Camillieri. The idea that it is enough to have reason, courage and some support to exercise command and control over society is as primitive as its results are destructive. There really are common problems that make “rentiers” hateful villains. Selling in installments in Brazil in 60 installments with interest of more than 2% per month is a crime against the popular economy, perpetrated daily, with the collaboration of the people's ignorance and impatience, which sometimes distorts their consumption pattern, attracted by the promise of comfort for their customers. durable goods. The result is default and a general feeling of illegality. This is not resolved by dictators, nor voluntarily.

There is a type of left that sees these leaders as the product of neoliberalism. This type of condescending opinion regarding the poverty of the political solutions of these charismatic leaders is not valid when concrete issues are at stake, such as the possibility of establishing a common strategy between Petrobras and Bolivia that favors both countries in the long term.

JU – There are those who see a plot hatched by Chávez, with Fidel's back, against the interests of Brazil in the recent Bolivian gas episode. Is the version fanciful or was Morales actually induced and/or suggested to adopt the measures?

Dedecca – It's fanciful. It is naive to believe that Chávez and Fidel will not support Morales in whatever he does in defense of Bolivia's national interests. It is important to highlight Lula's very considered position, among all the statements that have been made about what has been happening in Bolivia. He has recognized that Morales is doing what he should. This position even ended up creating friction between the president and Petrobras.

If the support of Chávez and Fidel tramples on Brazilian interests, be patient. When they talk about the possibility of a plot against Brazil, it seems that both are trying to stage a coup. It's nothing like that, even though it's obvious that Chávez wants to take over leadership in Latin America. This dispute is at stake, but Lula and Kirchner also want to assume this role. There is nothing bad about that.

Morales was elected promising to nationalize and has another election ahead of him. He needs to maintain his legitimacy within Bolivian society. If he does not have a strategy that is appropriate to his political times, he will probably lose his legitimacy. His initiative, which requires speed, is compatible with economic time. This is an initiative that converges with Chávez's interests. Fidel, in the isolated situation in which he lived for decades, endorses the stance of Chávez and Morales for obvious reasons. Frictions with Brazil are part of democracy.

Maciel – We cannot go down the path of guesswork or the mere repetition of hypotheses aired by the media. Ultimately, we have to be careful not to gratuitously belittle the figure of Morales and his indigenous agenda, right? The Andean group is Bolivarian in history; they are countries that joined the Andean Community of Nations; they carry the direct or indirect challenge of drug trafficking and the “enclavist” intentions of the United States in Colombia; As in other Latin American countries, they are people tired of the predatory nature of their elites, acutely suspicious of the State immersed in corruption. Regarding the specific point of natural gas, Bolivia has a history of struggles surrounding the exploitation of its natural resources. In fact, many recent events: the overthrow of Sánchez de Lozada, a crushing plebiscite victory in 2004. Does the top leader need someone to breathe political strategies into his ears?

Silveira – It is correct to think that PDVSA has interests and competes with Petrobras. However, Chávez seems to dangerously test the domino theory. Perhaps he believes that as happened in Asia, where China's power is asserting itself inexorably, and that such a situation could occur again. It is important to realize that there is no shortage of social crises in all countries involved, including Brazil. Thus, the ideological ridicule of a troglodytic left corresponds to a social and political situation in shambles in most Latin American countries.

In the Brazilian case, the problem is that our social complexity allows the maintenance of the democratic order and the articulation of drug trafficking with so-called revolutionary movements. The curious thing is that it is a market in which one side supplies drugs and the consumer finances the weapons of drug trafficking. No more than business, but which can be of great use in a situation of intentionally planned social disorganization. From this point of view, the Lula government is being realistic in recognizing that it is better to get involved than to pretend that the problem does not exist.

JU – What is your opinion on the media coverage of the episode?

Dedecca – I find it regrettable. The media is misinforming. Firstly, because it paints Evo Morales as a diabolical guy, when he does not classify him as unbalanced. Is not true. Morales was democratically elected. Secondly, because he insists that populism is being reborn. Is not true. Populism was a regime in which elites elected themselves and manipulated popular interests. Morales was elected and is a legitimate representative of the majority of the population. Are there problems in his positions? There is no doubt that they exist, just as there are positions adopted by all governments.

It is up to the media to inform 1) what are the possibilities of it moving differently, and 2) to mention the difficulties surrounding the negotiation regarding gas, showing that there were indeed advantages on the part of Petrobras in gas exploration, especially in terms of prices and conditions for purchasing assets in Bolivia. It is necessary to show that these prices necessarily need to be adjusted. It is imperative to warn that Bolivia does not have the technology to carry out a project of this nature. In fact, Bolivians are interested in selling gas to Petrobras. This is actually a contradictory position. Even though it is a game that has explicit contradictions, the press has not reported this. The media, in fact, has created a Judas.

Maciel – As a rule, the coverage – mainly on television – was within the current media standard: total identification with the “single” neoliberal thought, therefore defending the unrestricted freedom of movement and gains for national/international banking and deeply anti-republican regarding Citizenship for all. A renowned weekly magazine, Carta Capital, commented that the only thing missing was requests for the invasion of Bolivia by our troops... In the specific case of natural gas, it is about expropriation, nationalization, in short words execrated by the liberal peace of the markets.

Silveira – It was quite extensive. It even gave me a better understanding of the energy sector, which is not my field. The press operates as a replicator, as in evolutionary game models. You know exactly what the argument of Veja, Estadão and Carta Capital will be. Folha mixes everything in its own way. There are those who like it.

The joy of the press is that the Lula Government has contradictory positions regarding what would be an economic and social development project for Brazil. The same government that runs a gas pipeline in the Amazon causes a scandal every time a small beetle is “illegally removed” by multinationals....

JU – Jorge Castañeda recently stated (O Estado de S.Paulo, 30/04) that there are two types of left in Latin America. On the one hand, “the good left”, which would be “reformist, modern and open to new ideas”, which, according to him, would be present in Chile, and in part on the Brazilian and Uruguayan left. On the other, the one represented by Chávez, Morales, Fidel and Kirchner, which would be “the stupid, nationalist, noisy and mentally closed left”. Do you agree with this assessment?

Dedecca – Castañeda's position is typical of intellectual arrogance. It does not reflect the political dynamics of Latin America. This is a position that disregards the recent history of the continent. Making a dichotomy between the “good left” – which would be refined and cultured – and the other is very pretentious. What is new in these leftist movements in Latin America is that what is doing it is not the left with the tie, the polyglot representatives, but rather the one that represents a people who have not had the opportunity to organize themselves and speak their minds. Educated society not only finds it strange, but also sees it as immoral...

Castañeda's conservative position is pointless. You may even question the direction that part of the left is adopting, but it is undeniable that the Brazilian, Argentine, Venezuelan, Bolivian experiences, among others, are extremely important democratic advances for Latin America, including in terms of shaping political parties and the left. more consistent. This is part of democracy.

Maciel – It is a fact – apparently curious – that people started talking again, nostalgically remembering the post-war years in Brazil, in particular the implementation of the modern State by Vargas and the implementation of the Plan of Goals in the Juscelino Government. This has occurred, certainly, not to deify them or classify them as paradigms, but to try to revive the feeling of building a new country, which was vibrating at the time in the most diverse corners of Brazil.

Celso Furtado, in his beautiful auto-biographical book “Fantasia Organizada”, tells us how young people, himself, with carillon-style calculating machines and mechanical typewriters, obstinately launched radically renewing projects and actions on paper. They organized their fantasy, materialized what “good” economic theory vehemently condemned; After all, our comparative advantages, our supposedly agricultural “vocation”, were not compatible with such boldness. And how wrong it went! Growth of 7% between 1930 and 1980...

Single thought wants us to forget this past. Their spirited “think tanks”, the Heritage Foundation, Hudson Institute, Brookings Institution, etc., tell us: liberalizing reforms yesterday and tomorrow. Is today? Well, today it is possible to diagnose some problems due to mistakes made, errors in application, insufficient doses of medication. Basically, there are no causal links between reforms and problems. The “dumb” left is anti-Washington Consensus. But, what a pleasant surprise, a renowned Cambridge professor, Ha-Joon Chang, had to come to the tropics to remind us that the central countries want to prohibit us, at any cost, from implementing a similar set of policies that they themselves implemented to the consolidation of its industrialization.

Castañeda no longer believes in the “dumb” left. Without a doubt, it is made up of beings hardened by the painful contrast between their desire for change and the slowness with which real changes have occurred in the world. However, what can we constructively say to young people? The only distinguishable utopia, in this delicate historical period of humanity, is consumerism, with its derivations of hedonism, individualism and social segmentation. This is what leaders who are as mediocre as they are reckless defend it.

Silveira – I don't think this dichotomy is correct. It gives the impression that the “responsible left” controls a type of social crisis that even motivates the disintegration of political action. It is even worse if such a division implies accepting that the “left” must always be a prisoner of orthodox policies, as the only expression of the need and possibilities for State action.

Again, the issue is more complex. Firstly, the left must recognize that its first task is to combat precariousness: in living conditions, in institutions and even in the organization of markets. Second, we have to be able to tame the explosion of demands that characterize the modern world. See the action of non-governmental organizations. They have the postmodern potential to compromise any government plan, especially when they become radical in defending their point of view.

JU – Perhaps Latin America has never had so many left-wing governments. At the same rate, however, dissensions and divergences between different strands broke out. Would this confirm the thesis that the union of the left is a utopia?

Dedecca – These divergences are natural. We cannot imagine that political conditions will be easy in a region where the democratic tradition is so recent. It's the opposite. In fact, today we are learning to build democracy and understand the political cleavages that exist in society.

If in the Catholic Church, whose tradition goes back thousands of years, choosing the Pope takes up to a week, why do we, who have such a recent tradition of State management and democratic configurations, have to find solutions so quickly? This often hurts us, in the sense that we think it would be more pleasant if the results were closer to what we expect, but it is part of the process. Dissension was expected, even because this is a normal aspect at a time when national interests are being reestablished. It is natural for there to be a degree of tension between nations. I don't see anything new; I wouldn't expect anything very different from what we have observed.

Maciel – What is legacy? The radicality of the economic destruction by predatory Latin American elites, after a decade of external debts treated as war debts and another decade of hoarding of public assets. Twenty-five long years since 1980: timid growth without pronounced inflation is the recent positive mark, alongside the gigantic concentration of income and assets; dismantling of the State to universalize the provision of infrastructural services. Due to hard struggles for democratic achievements, free elections are held. In academia, we unlearned how to think about national development projects; Waves of economists, for example, write papers and more papers microfounding everything.

Unfortunately, the fraying of the social fabric has gone too far, the bonds of solidarity are severely broken within countries, and distrust towards democracy is not small. On the other hand, the heterogeneity of situations is a relevant fact: Brazil, Argentina, Andean countries... In a reality of social vulnerability and political instability, there is a long way to learn. It is not trivial to “break through” the barriers of globalization, and Bush Jr.-style American power is astonishingly asymmetrical in the global game.

Silveira – Again, what is desirable is to have governments that undertake to persistently combat precariousness, at the same time as being capable of identifying economic potential and social arrangements that generate situations of progress and prosperity. Uniting the left is, therefore, not a priority, since a “right-wing” government, in theory, could be aligned in an attempt to break the bottlenecks to development.

The problem is that the right that matters is ensconced in the wall of finance, selling promises of income that could only occur if the economy of the future is being engineered by some type of proactive action by the financial system. The argument that healthy banks avoid financial crises, that bankruptcy law allows companies to grow is typical of the right that acts protected by the “necessity” of the system, which in this case is the true market. It is interesting to note that productive markets are increasingly regulated – despite statements to the contrary from the economic right – and financial markets, in order to function, cover their almost complete freedom of movement.

JU – One of the Brazilian government's biggest bets, Mercosur is accumulating setbacks and showing signs of emptying. Uruguay, for example, threatens to abandon it to embrace free trade, an option made with relative success by Chile. Can it be said that the block is heading towards exhaustion?

Dedecca – I don't think Mercosur is heading towards the end. In fact, it continues in fits and starts, as it has done since its creation. The enormous difficulties began to exist from the definition of the basic characteristics of the project. Between 1995 and 97, for example, several Mercosur projects did not proceed. There were few who made more significant advances. In fact, to a large extent, Mercosur has managed to advance in terms of regulating intra-bloc trade. Other elements, including migration and the integration of regional work, have not moved an inch.

There are reasons for governments to maintain it. It is a task that has proven to be much more complex than originally imagined. In a situation of economic and social weakness, its advancement is hampered because it sometimes causes conflicts between countries, which are a result of internal precariousness.

Maciel – The “financialization” of global private wealth has greatly shortened the “long term” of investments: profitability in short periods has become a watchword. Now, “short-termism” is not a good horizon for analyzing Mercosur. The history of the European Union is that of a process that took 50 years to achieve the most complex unification, monetary. During this period, several structures were set up: European Snake, European Monetary System, Maastricht treaty; countries entered the bloc, left, re-entered. Anyway, “they”, who are the central countries, with convertible currencies, etc., took 50 years to reach the European Union and the euro. In fact, with broad support from the USA in its constitution.

Well, Latin American rulers introduced Mercosur in the 80s, trumpeting that, in a few years, “we would all be brothers”, even with the same currency! It turns out that the macroeconomic requirements for such a goal are enormous, mainly due to the external vulnerability of the countries, the scarce margin of maneuver of governments to execute autonomous policies, in an environment of open financial conditions that threaten the sovereignty of the members. The large countries in the bloc – Brazil and Argentina – need to have another direction for their macroeconomic policies, with a view to sustainable development: exchange rate policies, capital control, etc.
Only in this way will they be able to think of a more concerted and detached long term for the bloc. On the contrary, short-term nitpicking thrives today.

Silveira – Uruguay has not embraced free trade but rather proposes to establish yet another bilateral agreement, in the sea of ​​agreements of this type. Note that free trade, as a way of allocating skills and advantages among different countries in the world, does not guarantee good results for any country that is not prepared to be part of the game. Mercosur's difficulties reflect not only policy differences, but the contradictions and setbacks experienced by the bloc's countries in an increasingly competitive world. The temptation to deviate from the agreement at every business opportunity is great and the complementarity of assets between countries is not great. The fact is that Brazilian companies are, in practice, integrating some of these markets, in part, taking advantage of inconsistencies in policies such as the “Kandir Law”.