Graduação, 2o Semestre de 2007 - Segundas, das 10 às 12 h; terças, das 10
às 12 h.
Departamento de
Filosofia - Unicamp
http://www.unicamp.br/~chibeni
Lista 2 - Questões sobre a
Introdução dos Princípios do Conhecimento Humano (Berkeley)
Observações:
·
Esta
lista não é para nota; visa somente a auxiliar o estudo dos textos do
curso.
·
Forme
um par com outro colega e troque com ele as respostas (redigidas
individualmente). Cada um procurará corrigir a lista do outro, se preciso
consultando os textos apropriados. Depois, marquem um encontro para discussão
detalhada dos pontos de divergência ou dúvida.
·
Responda
de forma objetiva. Seja sucinto, mas
não esquemático. Cuide para que cada sentença faça sentido completo e seja
compreensível por uma pessoa que não conheça o assunto. Verifique
cuidadosamente a correção gramatical do que escreve. Não responda em bloco de
várias questões. Deixe amplas margens, para permitir anotações.
·
Indique
de forma precisa os parágrafos dos Princípios pertinentes à suas
respostas.
Questões:
2.
No § 10 Berkeley inicia sua crítica a essa proposta, dizendo
que pelo menos ele, Berkeley, não é capaz de formar tais idéias abstratas.
Admite, porém, que podemos abstrair idéias, em outro sentido. Explique esses
dois sentidos de abstração.
3.
No § 11 Berkeley cita uma passagem do Ensaio e logo em
seguida dá, pela primeira vez, a sua resposta ao problema central levantado por
Locke de como os termos se tornam gerais. Qual é essa resposta?
(Apresente, na sua resposta, um dos exemplos dados por Berkeley.)
4.
Nos § 12 e 15 Berkeley fornece a sua explicação das idéias
gerais. a) Apresente essa explicação. b) Encontre, no Ensaio, uma
passagem em que Locke expõe essencialmente a mesma explicação. (Cite e comente
as semelhanças e, se for o caso, as diferenças.)
5.
No § 16 Berkeley considera a objeção à teoria proposta
(segundo a qual tudo o que existe –palavras, idéias, coisas – é particular), de
que, se assim fosse, uma demonstração de uma proposição geométrica feita acerca
de um triângulo só valeria para ele, e não de forma universal. Explique melhor
essa objeção e mostre como Berkeley a responde.
Respostas (S. S. Chibeni):
6: “ideas become general, by separating from
them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may
determine them to this or that particular existence”.
7: “The ideas of the nurse and the mother are
well framed in their [young children’s] minds; and, like pictures of them
there, represent only those individuals. The names they first gave to
them are confined to these individuals; and the names of nurse and mamma,
the child uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when time
and a larger acquaintance have made them observe that there are a great many
other things in the world, that in some common agreements of shape, and several
other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and those persons they have
been used to, they frame an idea, which they find those many particulars do
partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name man, for
example. And thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea. Wherein
they make nothing new; but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter
and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what
is common to them all.”
8: “By the
same way that they come by the general name and idea of man, they easily
advance to more general names and notions. For, observing that several things
that differ from their idea of man, and cannot therefore be comprehended under
that name, have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with man, by retaining
only those qualities, and uniting them into one idea, they have again another
and more general idea; to which having given a name they make a term of a more
comprehensive extension: which new idea is made, not by any new addition, but
only as before, by leaving out the shape, and some other properties signified
by the name man, and retaining only a body, with life, sense, and
spontaneous motion, comprehended under the name animal.”
“General and universal are
creatures of the understanding, and belong not to the real existence of things.
To return to general words: it is plain, by what has been said, that general
and universal belong not to the real existence of things; but are the
inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and
concern only signs, whether words or ideas. Words are general, as has been
said, when used for signs of general ideas, and so are applicable indifferently
to many particular things; and ideas are general when they are set up as the
representatives of many particular things: but universality belongs not to
things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even
those words and ideas which in their signification are general. When therefore
we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own
making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into,
by the understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For the
signification they have is nothing but a relation that, by the mind of man, is
added to them.”